Francis Bacon, Prerogative Instances, and Argumentation Schemes

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HOPOS 2010
Central European University, Budapest, 25 June
Outline

1. Francis Bacon
2. The Topical Tradition
3. Prerogative Instances
4. Argumentation Schemes
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Prerogative Instances

1. Solitary Instances
2. Migratory Instances
3. Striking Instances
4. Clandestine Instances
5. Constitutive Instances
6. Instances Conformable
7. Singular Instances
8. Deviating Instances
9. Bordering Instances
10. Instances of Power
11. Instances of Companionship and of Enmity
12. Subjunctive Instances
13. Instances of Alliance or Union
14. Instances of the Fingerpost
15. Instances of Divorce
16. Instances of the Lamp
17. Instances of the Door or Gate
18. Summoning Instances
19. Instances of the Road
20. Supplementary or Substitutive Instances
21. Dissecting Instances
22. Instances of the Rod or Rule
23. Instances of the Course
24. Instances of Quantity
25. Instances of Strife
26. Intimating Instances
27. Polychrest Instances
28. Instances of Magic
[B]orrowing the term from the fingerposts which are set up where roads part, to indicate the several directions. These I also call *Decisive and Judicial*, and in some cases, *Oracular and Commanding Instances*. I explain them thus. When in the investigation of any nature the understanding is so balanced as to be uncertain to which of two or more natures the cause of the nature in question should be assigned on account of the frequent and ordinary concurrence of many natures, instances of the fingerpost show the union of one of the natures with the nature in question to be sure and indissoluble, of the other to be varied and separable; and thus the question is decided
Instances of Divorce

[W]hich indicate the separation of natures of most familiar occurrence. . . . They differ from the instances subjoined to the instances of companionship, in that the latter indicate the separation of a nature from some concrete substance with which it is ordinarily in conjunction, while these instances indicate the separation of one nature from another. They differ from instances of the fingerpost, in that they determine nothing, but simply notify the separability of one nature from another. Their use is to detect false forms and to dissipate slight theories suggested by what lies on the surface, and so serve as ballast to the understanding.
Argumentation Scheme for Defeasible Modus Ponens

As a rule, if $P$, then $Q$.

$P$.

It is not the case that there is an exception to the rule that if $P$, then $Q$.

Therefore, $Q$.

Argument from Analogy

Argumentation Scheme for Argument from Analogy

**Similarity Premise** Typically, case $C_1$ is similar to case $C_2$.

**Base Premise** $A$ is true (false) in case $C_1$.

**Conclusion** $A$ is true (false) in case $C_2$.

Critical Questions:

1. Are there differences between $C_1$ and $C_2$ that would tend to undermine the force of the similarity cited?
2. Is $A$ true (false) in $C_1$?
3. Is there some other case $C_3$ that is also similar to $C_1$, but in which $A$ is false (true)?

Appeal to Expert Opinion

Argument Scheme for Appeal to Expert Opinion

**Major Premise**  
Source $E$ is an expert in subject domain $S$ containing proposition $A$.

**Minor Premise**  
$E$ asserts that proposition $A$ is true (false).

**Conclusion**  
$A$ is true (false).

Critical Questions:

1. Expertise Question: How credible is $E$ as an expert source?
2. Field Question: Is $E$ an expert in the field that $A$ is in?
3. Opinion Question: What did $E$ assert that implies $A$?
4. Trustworthiness Question: Is $E$ personally reliable as a source?
5. Consistency Question: Is $A$ consistent with what other experts assert?
6. Backup Evidence Question: Is $E$’s assertion based on evidence?

Ethotic Argument

**Argument Scheme for Ethotic Argument**

**Premise**  
If \( x \) is a person of good [bad] moral character, then what \( x \) contends (\( A \)) should be accepted [rejected] (as more [less] plausible).

**Premise**  
\( a \) is a person of good [bad] moral character.

**Conclusion**  
Therefore, what \( a \) contends (\( A \)) should be accepted [rejected] (as more [less] plausible).

**Critical Questions:**

1. Is \( a \) a person of good [bad] moral character?
2. Is the question of \( a \)'s character relevant, in the context of dialogue in the given case?
3. How strong a weight of presumption in favor of [against] \( A \) is claimed, and is that strength warranted by the case?

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